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LIMITED FAITH IN THE GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT REQUIRES 
A WARRANT FOR GPS SEARCHES AND 
NARROWS THE SCOPE OF THE DAVIS 
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY  
RULE IN UNITED STATES. v. KATZIN 
Abstract: On October 22, 2013, in United States v. Katzin, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that police and federal agents must obtain a 
warrant prior to attaching a GPS device on a vehicle. In doing so, the Third 
Circuit became the first federal appeals court to add a warrant requirement to 
the practice of GPS tracking by the police. The court also held that the good 
faith exception did not excuse the warrantless use of a GPS device, and that 
law enforcement’s reliance on out-of-circuit or distinguishable authority alone 
was insufficient to support a finding of good faith. This Comment argues that 
the Third Circuit took a mistakenly narrow view of the good faith exception, 
and failed to further the purpose of the exception as determined by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. This Comment contends that on rehearing en banc, the Third 
Circuit conducted a superior good faith analysis of the law enforcement con-
duct in Katzin, and correctly reversed the district court’s decision to apply the 
exclusionary rule. 
INTRODUCTION 
As developing technology has led to significant advancements in law 
enforcement surveillance, courts have become increasingly divided over the 
constitutionality of tracking devices in regard to the Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.1 The U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”); see also Priscilla J. Smith et al., When Machines Are 
Watching: How Warrantless Use of GPS Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment 
Right Against Unreasonable Searches, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 177, 181–88 (2011), http://www.yale
lawjournal.org/forum/when-machines-are-watching-how-warrantless-use-of-gps-surveillance-technol-
ogy-violates-the-fourth-amendment-right-against-unreasonable-searches, archived at http://perma.cc/
N5YE-GSTE (discussing how, as challenges to law enforcement’s warrantless uses of GPS surveil-
lance technology have increased, courts have begun to split, and are now looking for direction from 
the Supreme Court); Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Restricts Police GPS Tracking, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 24, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-warrants-
needed-in-gps-tracking/2012/01/ 23/gIQAx7qGLQ_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HY2E-
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recently held that the attachment of a GPS tracker to a vehicle constitutes a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.2 Yet the Supreme Court left open the 
question of whether warrantless use of GPS devices would be lawful under 
the Fourth Amendment where officers have both reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause to execute such searches.3 
In 2013, in United States v. Katzin (Katzin I), the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit provided an answer to this issue, holding that the 
police must obtain a warrant prior to attaching a GPS device onto a vehi-
cle.4 The court further concluded that the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule did not apply to excuse the warrantless use of the GPS.5 The 
Third Circuit held that there was no binding precedent upon which the of-
ficers in Katzin could have relied, and that reliance by law enforcement 
solely on out-of-circuit or distinguishable authority was not sufficient to 
support the good faith exception.6 
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit’s failure to apply the good 
faith exception was based on a mistakenly narrow view of the exception and 
its purpose, and that the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, properly reversed the 
decision.7 Part I of this Comment introduces the development of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in light of evolving surveillance technology, the 
exclusionary rule, and applications of the good faith exception.8 Part I also 
provides the factual and procedural background of Katzin I.9 Part II then 
discusses the Third Circuit panel’s reasoning behind requiring a warrant for 
GPS searches, as well as its decision to limit the good faith exception to 
binding appellate precedent.10 Finally, Part III explores the purpose of the 
good faith exception, and examines whether the panel’s ruling actually fur-
thered this purpose.11 Part III also examines the decision made by the Third 
Circuit, sitting en banc, to reverse the district court’s application of the ex-
                                                                                                                           
CMBX (discussing the decision in United States v. Jones and society’s expectation of privacy in the 
digital age). See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–53 (2012) (reviewing past 
cases that have dealt with tracking technology and the Fourth Amendment). 
 2 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (holding that physically occupying private property through  
use of a GPS to obtain information was a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 3 See id. at 954 (stating that since the Government did not raise this argument in front of the 
D.C. Circuit, it was forfeited and the Court would not address it). 
 4 See 732 F.3d 187, 204–05 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d en banc, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 5 See id. at 214. The good faith exception allows for the admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence at trial in cases where the police acted with an objectively reasonable good faith belief that 
their conduct was lawful. See id. at 205. 
 6 See id. at 213–14. 
 7 See infra notes 13–98 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 13–36 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 48–63 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 70–85 and accompanying text. 
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clusionary rule, and argues that the en banc opinion offers a superior inter-
pretation of the good faith exception and its purpose.12 
I. LEGAL LANDSCAPE BEHIND GPS SEARCHES AND  
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION 
As tracking technology has continued to evolve, courts have grappled 
with how to reconcile the need of law enforcement to utilize such devices 
with the court’s duty to protect Fourth Amendment rights.13 Section A dis-
cusses the Supreme Court’s adaptation of Fourth Amendment principles to 
address law enforcement’s use of advancing technology.14 Section B ex-
plains the nature and application of the exclusionary rule, which prevents 
evidence discovered pursuant to an illegal search from being used to estab-
lish a defendant’s guilt.15 Section C introduces the factual and procedural 
history of Katzin.16 
A  From Beepers to GPS: Evolving Technology and the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the American people to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, homes, and 
property.17 Courts determine whether a particular search is unreasonable by 
balancing the extent of the search’s intrusion against its promotion of legit-
imate governmental interests.18 When striking this balance in criminal cas-
es, the majority of courts favor the procedures delineated by the Warrant 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment.19 Consequently, warrantless searches and 
seizures are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, except for 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 86–98 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–53 (discussing how past cases have handled the constitutional-
ity of tracking technology with regard to the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705, 711–17 (1984) (examining the constitutionality of beeper tracking of a vehicle and inside a 
private residence); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–84 (1983) (analyzing the constitu-
tionality of beeper tracking of a vehicle). 
 14 See infra notes 17–29 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text. 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 18 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (holding that ultimate 
measure of a search’s constitutionality is its reasonableness, which is judged by a balancing test). 
 19 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support-
ed by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (holding that 
a search or seizure is not reasonable unless accomplished in accordance with a judicial warrant 
issued on probable cause except for in specific well-defined circumstances); United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (stating that in ordinary cases, a seizure of personal property is 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless accomplished with a warrant). 
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certain limited exceptions.20 For example, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized such exceptions in special needs cases, or in “stop and frisk” situa-
tions.21 Courts have also permitted warrantless searches under the “automo-
bile exception,” which allows for the warrantless search of a vehicle when 
there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.22 
Nevertheless, courts still mandate that a warrantless search of a car be based 
on probable cause, and the exception is only allowed in a limited number of 
cases.23 
As technology has progressed, courts have become increasingly divid-
ed over how to reconcile the Fourth Amendment with advancements in 
tracking technology used by the police. 24  In 1983, in United States v. 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967)). Warrantless searches are those conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by a court. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. Since deciding Terry v. Ohio in 1968, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has identified various law enforcement actions that qualify as Fourth Amendment 
searches and seizures, but may be conducted without a warrant or probable cause. See 392 U.S. 1, 
30 (1968); see also Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 197–201 (discussing types of searches and seizures that 
may be conducted without warrant or probable cause). 
 21 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (explaining that the Supreme Court has 
allowed exceptions to the warrant requirement when special needs reaching beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement make requiring a warrant and probable-cause impractical); Terry, 392 
U.S. at 19, 22–27 (holding that a police officer can “stop” an individual on the street for question-
ing and then “frisk” him to determine if he’s carrying weapons without a warrant); see also Skin-
ner, 489 U.S. at 634 (holding that alcohol and drug tests of railroad employees are reasonable 
even in the absence of a warrant or reasonable suspicion); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 
(1987) (holding that government employers and supervisors may conduct warrantless, work-
related searches of employees’ desks and offices without probable cause); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985) (holding that school officials may conduct warrantless searches of 
some student property without probable cause). 
 22 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (holding that if probable cause justifies 
search of a vehicle, then every part of the vehicle and its contents that could conceal the object in 
question may be searched); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (explaining that the 
treatment of automobiles is based in part on the fact that a vehicle’s inherent mobility often makes 
procuring a warrant impractical); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (holding that 
the Fourth Amendment recognizes the difference between the invasion of a house or structure for 
which a warrant could easily be obtained, and that of an automobile, where it is less practical 
because the vehicle could be easily moved out of the jurisdiction where the warrant is sought); 
United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 100 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that warrantless searches of an 
automobile are permitted if there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband); United 
States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 343 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding the warrantless search of an auto-
mobile with probable cause to be constitutional under the “automobile exception”). 
 23 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 198 (stating that the difference between automobiles and other 
dwellings still requires that a warrantless search of a car be based on probable cause, and even 
then, only in a highly limited number of cases); see also Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (holding that the 
automobile exception is still unquestionably a “specifically established and well delineated” one); 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461–62 (1971) (stating that “the word ‘automobile’ is 
not a talisman whose presence dissipates the Fourth Amendment”). 
 24 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d. at 194; see also Catherine Crump, Supreme Court GPS Ruling: Bring-
ing the 4th Amendment into the 21st Century, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Jan. 26, 2012, 2:05 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/supreme-court-gps-ruling-bringing-4th-amendment-
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Knotts, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of using 
tracking devices, and held that concealing a beeper inside of a container that 
was then loaded onto a target’s vehicle did not constitute a search.25 Revisit-
ing the issue in 1984, in United States v. Karo, the U.S. Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that hiding a beeper inside a container to track a vehicle was not a 
search, but held that monitoring the container in a private residence was 
unconstitutional.26 
After technological advances led to law enforcement’s use of GPS de-
vices, in 2010, in United States v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
magnetically attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s automobile constituted a 
search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.27 The Court concluded that 
the attachment of a GPS to a target car was a physical intrusion upon the 
vehicle owner’s private property, and that the Government physically occu-
pying private property in order to obtain information is a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.28 Jones left open, however, the question of whether 
warrantless use of GPS devices would be considered reasonable under the 
                                                                                                                           
21st-century, archived at https://perma.cc/P72Z-5LW4?type=pdf (discussing how surveillance cam-
eras and GPS tracking have removed the technical barrier to mass surveillance of Americans’ move-
ments, making legal barriers even more critical). 
 25 See 460 U.S. at 285. The Court explained that “a person traveling in an automobile on 
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.” Id. at 281–82 (holding that when defendant travelled over public streets he voluntarily 
conveyed that he was travelling over certain roads in a particular direction, which stops he made, 
and his final destination when he left public roads and traveled onto private property). But the 
Court warned that if police began utilizing twenty-four hour “dragnet type law enforcement prac-
tices,” different constitutional principles could apply. See id. at 283–84. 
 26 See 468 U.S. at 712–14 (explaining that unlike in Knotts, the information obtained by mon-
itoring the beeper inside of a private residence gave the DEA information that could not be visual-
ly verified). 
 27 See 132 S. Ct. at 949. In reaching this conclusion, the Court overruled decisions from the 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which had all held that attaching a GPS device to a target car 
was not a constitutional violation. See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 
2010) (holding that police do not need a warrant to install a non-invasive GPS tracking device to a 
vehicle in a public place); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that attaching a mobile tracking device to a vehicle parked on a public street did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that attaching a GPS device to a target vehicle merely substituted for following a car on a 
public street); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that be-
cause the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the exposed undercarriage of his 
vehicle, installing a GPS device there was not a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 28 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment, joined by 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan, but argued that the 
appropriate Fourth Amendment analysis was the “reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry. See 
id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). The concurrence reasoned that society’s expectation has been 
that law enforcement would and could not “secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement 
of an individual’s car for a very long period.” See id. at 964. 
38 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
Fourth Amendment where officers have reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause to execute such searches.29 
B. The Exclusionary Rule and the Good Faith Exception 
Although the Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, the Amendment does not speak to the suppression of 
evidence acquired by law enforcement in violation of this directive.30 The 
U.S. Supreme Court, however, created the exclusionary rule, which general-
ly prohibits the admission of evidence obtained during an unlawful search 
in a criminal trial.31 The rule aims to deter unlawful searches and seizures 
by removing any incentive for the police to disregard the Fourth Amend-
ment.32 Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the 
argument that application of the exclusionary rule is a necessary conse-
quence of a Fourth Amendment violation, and has made clear that exclusion 
should be a last resort.33 
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the existence of 
a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where law en-
forcement acted with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their 
conduct was lawful.34 The good faith belief must be based on some absolute 
legal authority or information that justified law enforcement’s actions.35 In 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See id. at 954 (explaining that this was not an issue the court currently needed to address). 
 30 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) (stating 
that the exclusionary rule is not designed to rectify damage caused by an unconstitutional search); 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (noting that the Fourth Amendment does not 
include any provision proscribing the introduction of illegally seized evidence). 
 31 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009); United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 32 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347; see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (explain-
ing that the rule compels deference to the Fourth Amendment’s guaranty in the only effective 
means available). 
 33 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 140–41; Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1995) (explaining 
that courts have rejected a reflexive application of the exclusionary rule); Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 
(stating the Fourth Amendment does not have a provision expressly excluding the use of illegally 
obtained evidence). Not every Fourth Amendment violation triggers the exclusionary rule. See 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 140; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (holding that wheth-
er the exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate is separate from whether the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the party trying to invoke the rule were violated). The rule is not a personal constitutional 
right, but a judicially created remedy meant to defend Fourth Amendment rights through deter-
rence. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
 34 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427–28. The Court in Davis explained that excluding evidence in 
those types of cases would not actually deter police misconduct but would inflict considerable 
social costs. See id. at 2434. The Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when police 
reasonably rely on binding appellate precedent to conduct a search. See id. 
 35 See id. at 2429 (holding that police reasonably relied on later-reversed binding appellate 
precedent); Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48 (concluding that the exclusionary rule should not apply 
because of an undiscovered error in a police-maintained database); Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 (holding 
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determining whether the good faith exception applies, the Court balances 
the value of deterring police misconduct through the exclusionary rule 
against the cost of excluding the evidence, such as permitting a guilty de-
fendant to go free.36  
C. Factual and Procedural History of United States v. Katzin 
In 2013, in Katzin I, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
decided that police and federal agents must obtain a warrant prior to attach-
ing a GPS device on a vehicle.37 After a wave of pharmacy burglaries in 
Delaware, Maryland, and New Jersey, state and federal officials began a 
joint investigation in which Harry Katzin and his brothers emerged as the 
primary suspects. 38 After consulting with the U.S. Attorney’s office, but 
without obtaining a warrant, the FBI affixed a “slap-on” GPS tracker to the 
exterior of Katzin’s van.39 Although the police did not appear to have a set 
time limit for using the tracker, within several days the tracker indicated 
that the van had traveled to the immediate vicinity of a pharmacy.40 The 
police confirmed the pharmacy in question had been burglarized, and sub-
sequently stopped the vehicle.41 After discovering Katzin and his brothers in 
the van, as well as merchandise and equipment from the pharmacy, the po-
lice impounded the van and arrested the brothers.42 
The Katzin brothers moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a re-
sult of the warrantless use of the GPS device.43 The U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in favor of the brothers and sup-
pressed all evidence found in the van, a decision the Government subse-
                                                                                                                           
that the purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be served where officers relied on a subse-
quently invalidated search warrant). 
 36 See United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. 
at 144) (holding that the exclusionary rule only applies when police conduct is “sufficiently delib-
erate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is 
worth the price paid by the justice system” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Davis, 
131 S. Ct. at 2429 (explaining that an officer who conducts a search in reliance on binding appel-
late precedent is acting as a reasonable officer should, and noting that an exclusion would only 
discourage the officer from doing his duty). Accordingly, the exclusionary rule applies when po-
lice conduct is “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,” or when it will deter “recurring or sys-
temic negligence.” See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. 
 37 See 732 F.3d at 191. 
 38 See id. Katzin became a suspect after police received various reports of him being seen 
around Rite Aid pharmacies, as well as footage of a van resembling Katzin’s parked outside of a 
recently burglarized Rite Aid. See id. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See id. at 193. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. 
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quently appealed.44 On appeal, a divided panel of the Third Circuit held that 
police must obtain a warrant prior to attaching a GPS device on a vehicle, 
and that reliance by law enforcement personnel on out-of-circuit or distin-
guishable authority was insufficient to support a per se finding of good 
faith.45 The U.S. Department of Justice petitioned the Third Circuit to re-
hear en banc the good faith exception decision, which the Third Circuit 
granted.46 In Katzin II, the en banc court, on October 1, 2014, reversed the 
decision of the district court, and held that the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule should apply in.47 
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT PANEL’S REASONING BEHIND THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT AND LIMITATION OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION 
In 2013, in United States v. Katzin (Katzin I), the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit panel determined that the police’s warrantless 
GPS search was unlawful, and the evidence obtained was subject to the ex-
clusionary rule.48 Section A discusses the Third Circuit’s examination and 
ultimate rejection of various justifications for the warrantless search.49 Sec-
tion B explores the court’s decision not to apply the good faith exception 
based on the court’s belief that the police did not reasonably rely on binding 
precedent.50 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 1646894, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 
2012), rev’d en banc, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014). The Government appealed on the grounds that 
a warrant was not required for use of a GPS tracker; the police acted in good faith when installing 
the GPS device; and Katzin’s brothers lacked standing to challenge the search because they did 
not own the van. See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 193. 
 45 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 191; see also supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where law enforcement acted with an 
objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful). The Third Circuit also 
found that the defendant passengers of the illegally stopped vehicle had standing to challenge the 
stop and seek suppression of the evidence. See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 191. 
 46 See United States v. Katzin, No. 12-2548, 2013 WL 7033666, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2013) 
(granting petition for en banc rehearing). 
 47 See United States v. Katzin (Katzin II), 769 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 48 See United States v. Katzin (Katzin I), 732 F.3d 187, 199–205 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d en 
banc, 769 F.3d 163. Katzin I was the first federal appeals court since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2012 decision in United States v. Jones to hold that GPS tracking of a vehicle required a warrant. 
See id. The U.S. Supreme Court in Jones held that using a GPS device constitutes a search, but 
chose not to address the search’s lawfulness based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See 
132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
 49 See infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
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A. An Ongoing Endeavor: Why Warrantless Searches Using GPS Are Not 
Justifiable Based on Reasonable Suspicion or Probable Cause 
In deciding Katzin I, the Third Circuit panel first considered whether 
the warrantless use of a GPS device based on less than probable cause is a 
valid constitutional search.51 The court considered three general categories 
of warrantless searches that are permitted based on less than probable 
cause: “special needs” cases, circumstances in which individuals have less-
ened privacy interests, and “stop and frisk” progeny.52 The Third Circuit 
ultimately determined that none of these exceptions to the probable cause 
requirement applied to the law enforcement conduct in Katzin.53  
The Third Circuit also rejected the Government’s argument that a war-
rantless GPS search is similar to an automobile search, which may be con-
stitutional in the absence of a warrant, if supported by probable cause.54 The 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See 732 F.3d at 198. 
 52 See id.; see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (holding that proba-
tioner suspected of criminal conduct has significantly diminished privacy interests); Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (holding that a diminished expectation of privacy 
attaches to information related to the fitness of railroad employees); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 
(1968) (holding that a warrantless stop of an individual on the street by a police officer was per-
missible based on less than probable cause if a police officer observed conduct that led to the 
reasonable conclusion that criminal activity may be occurring); supra notes 19–23 and accompa-
nying text (discussing various law enforcement actions that qualify as Fourth Amendment search-
es and seizures, but may still be conducted without a warrant or probable cause according to the 
Supreme Court). 
53 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 199–200. The court determined the search did not qualify under 
the “special needs” doctrine because the Government could not specify a particular purpose for the 
GPS tracking, and the primary goal of a “special needs” search cannot be to simply find evidence 
for law enforcement purposes. See id. at 199; see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 
67, 83–84 (2001) (holding that to qualify for “special needs” exception, the primary purpose of the 
search cannot be to produce evidence); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) 
(finding that search did not qualify where its primary aim could not be differentiated from a gen-
eral interest in crime control). The court next rejected the diminished privacy argument, holding 
that Katzin had the full extent of privacy interests guaranteed to him by the Constitution when the 
police executed their GPS search. See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 200. The court also noted that although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that individuals have a lowered expectation of privacy in 
their cars, police still need probable cause to search a vehicle absent certain circumstances that 
were not present in the case. See id.; see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579–80 (1991) 
(establishing one rule to govern all automobile searches). Lastly, the Third Circuit distinguished a 
“stop and frisk” search, which is limited to a specific instance in time, from the warrantless GPS 
search, which the court held was an ongoing and much broader venture. See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 
200 (noting that the search in Terry was also limited to determining whether the individual was 
armed or posed a danger); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 
(1967) (reasoning that eavesdropping for two-month period is the equivalent of a series of intru-
sions, searches, and seizures). 
 54 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 203 (holding that attaching and monitoring a GPS tracker is dif-
ferent from a traditional automobile exception search because it establishes an ongoing police 
presence in order to discover evidence that may come into existence); see also United States v. 
McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 343 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding warrantless search of an automobile with 
42 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
court distinguished a GPS search from the automobile exception: although 
the automobile exception permits police to physically intrude into a vehicle 
to retrieve or examine already existing evidence, a GPS search deals with 
future evidence the police suspect could be discovered by using the GPS.55 
The court reasoned that a GPS search extends the police intrusion of the vehi-
cle far beyond the time and scope of a traditional automobile search under the 
exception.56 Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded that the Government re-
quires a warrant when intending to intrude upon a vehicle longer than is nec-
essary to locate and verify already-existing evidence of criminal activity.57 
B. Limiting the Good Faith Exception to Binding Precedent 
After concluding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, the 
Third Circuit panel held that the evidence against Katzin and his brothers 
was properly suppressed under the exclusionary rule.58 The Government 
urged the court to apply the good faith exception, arguing that law enforce-
ment personnel had relied on a majority consensus among the circuit courts, 
guidance from Supreme Court decisions, and the advisement of the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office.59 The Third Circuit, however, rejected these arguments 
and refused to apply the good faith exception, determining that the legal 
authorities the police relied upon did not constitute binding precedent.60 
                                                                                                                           
probable cause to be constitutional under “automobile exception”); supra notes 22–23 and accom-
panying text (discussing searches allowed under the “automobile exception,” which permits the 
warrantless search of a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evi-
dence of a crime). 
 55 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d. at 203. 
 56 See id. (explaining that the exception is “limited to a discreet moment in time” to permit the 
police to enter and search a vehicle to determine whether it contains the evidence suspected to be 
inside); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (holding that the automobile 
exception has specifically established and well delineated contours). 
 57 Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 204; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979) (holding that 
if an individual was subjected to “unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an auto-
mobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed”). 
 58 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 205; see also United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule only applies when police conduct is “sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully 
deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice sys-
tem” (internal quotation marks omitted)); supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text (discussing 
the exclusionary rule, which generally prohibits the admission of evidence obtained during an 
unlawful search in a criminal trial, as well as the rule’s limitations). 
 59 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 206; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712–14 (1984); 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983); infra note 76 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing sister circuit courts that previously held police did not need to obtain a warrant to install a GPS 
tracking device). 
 60 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 209–10. The court reasoned that it is not the duty of law enforce-
ment personnel for purposes of the exclusionary rule to analyze and weigh the decisions of sister 
courts in an effort to predict how the court in their own circuit would decide if faced with a similar 
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Furthermore, the court held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in 
Davis v. United States extends good faith protection only to acts explicitly 
authorized by clear and well-established precedent, and determined that the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in United States v. Knotts and 1984 
decision in United States v. Karo did not qualify.61 
The Third Circuit further concluded that extending the rationale from 
Davis to cover reliance on out-of-circuit precedent would contradict the 
principle of the good faith exception and undermine the concept that clear 
and well-settled precedent should control.62 Ultimately, the court held that 
the police had recklessly relied on a self-derived constitutional principle, 
and concluded that the exclusion of the evidence would incentivize police 
to “err on the side of constitutional behavior” and help prevent future 
Fourth Amendment violations.63 
III. A NARROW VIEW OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION AND THE EN BANC 
COURT’S PROPER GOOD FAITH ANALYSIS 
Although the Third Circuit panel’s decision that the police were re-
quired to obtain a warrant was not in dispute, the court’s unnecessarily lim-
ited view of the good faith exception was challenged and subsequently va-
cated on the en banc rehearing.64 In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit panel’s analysis of the good faith exception in United States v. 
Katzin (Katzin I) was improperly focused on determining that the U.S. Su-
preme Court beeper cases and out-of-circuit holdings on GPS searches 
could not suffice as binding precedent, rather than examining the culpability 
                                                                                                                           
factual situation. See id. at 209. Yet, at the same time, the court held that law enforcement officials 
should have been on notice once another circuit court had suggested that GPS searches violated 
the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 213 n.24. 
 61 See id. at 207 (noting the lack of a physical intrusion in Knotts and Karo, as well as 
“marked technological differences” between beepers and GPS trackers). The court reasoned that 
the conduct in Knotts and Karo did not qualify as binding precedent because both cases involved 
the police placing the beeper inside of a container that was then loaded onto a vehicle, and there-
fore did not involve a physical trespass like in Katzin. See id.; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 712; 
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285; Orin Kerr, Does Using a GPS Device to Track a Suspect Constitute a 
Fourth Amendment Search?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 21, 2011, 3:09 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2011/10/does-using-a-gps-device-to-track-a-suspect-constitute-a-fourth-amendment-search/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y4MB-KL2K (examining the reasoning behind the Knotts and Karo 
decisions and finding the Jones approach set a more amorphous standard). 
 62 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 208; see also supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing recognition of the good faith exception for the purpose of allowing evidence in cases where 
law enforcement had a reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct was lawful). 
 63 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 212 (determining that law enforcement personnel had assumed 
that the Third Circuit would find with the majority of sister circuits). 
 64 See United States v. Katzin (Katzin II), 769 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
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of the police conduct.65 This Part argues that the Third Circuit’s narrow 
view of the good faith exception failed to recognize the exception’s pur-
pose, and the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, was correct to reverse the deci-
sion to apply the exclusionary rule in Katzin II.66 Section A contends that 
the court should have found that the police in Katzin did reasonably rely on 
binding precedent.67 Section B asserts that, even if the court did not find 
past precedent to suffice, the officers’ conduct still does not rise to the level 
of reckless, negligent conduct that the exclusionary rule is meant to dis-
courage.68 Section C argues that the en banc court conducted a superior in-
terpretation of the good faith exception and its purpose, and properly re-
versed the district court’s application of the exclusionary rule.69 
A. Ignoring Good Faith for Binding Precedent 
The Third Circuit, sitting en banc to rehear arguments on the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule in Katzin II, was correct to decide not to up-
hold the panel’s limited view of the good faith exception.70 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that the standard for the good-faith exception is objec-
tive: would a reasonably well-trained officer have known the search was 
illegal in light of all of the circumstances.71 Yet the majority’s argument in 
Katzin I implies that the main criterion for the exception is whether the of-
ficers relied upon binding appellate precedent.72 Consequently, the Third 
Circuit’s analysis of the officers’ good faith is unduly influenced by the 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See United States v. Katzin (Katzin I), 732 F.3d 187, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2013) (acknowledg-
ing that the good faith balancing test inquiry requires more than whether the police’s reliance on 
out-of-circuit authority is sufficient, but then stating that the court remains extremely disconcerted 
by the lack of binding appellate guidance), rev’d en banc, 769 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2014); id. at 220 
(Van Antwerpen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority’s decision 
to first address whether the sister circuit cases qualified as binding appellate precedent later infects 
the more general good-faith analysis). 
66 See infra notes 70–98 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text. 
 68 See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text. 
69 See infra notes 86–98 and accompanying text. 
 70 See 769 F.3d at 169–70; Orin Kerr, Third Circuit Requires Warrant for GPS Monitoring and 
Limits Good-Faith Exception in United States v. Katzin, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 23, 2013 3:30 
AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/23/third-circuit-requires-warrant-gps-monitoring-limits-good-
faith-exception-united-states-v-katzin/, archived at http://perma.cc/L7DL-TSUZ (discussing how the 
Third Circuit took a different, more narrow view of Davis than other circuits). 
 71 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–
20 (1984); see Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011) (stating that “the harsh sanction 
of exclusion should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity”). 
 72 See 732 F.3d at 209–11 (conducting an extensive analysis on the binding precedent inquiry, 
coming to a conclusion, and then performing the culpability and deterrence analysis as somewhat 
of an afterthought); id. at 220 (Van Antwerpen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (con-
tending that the majority’s analysis of the good faith balancing test is fragmented by discussion of 
whether the officers relied on binding appellate precedent). 
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court’s belief that the officers lacked binding precedent to rely on, resulting 
in the court’s failure to recognize the rule’s ultimate purpose.73 
Furthermore, the court should have determined that the officers rea-
sonably relied on the binding precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo, which both held 
that concealing a beeper inside of a vehicle as a tracking device did not con-
stitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.74 The Court in Knotts even 
went so far as to state that a person traveling in a vehicle on public roads 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from place to 
place.75 At the time the search in Katzin occurred, every circuit court to 
consider the GPS issue except one had concluded that police did not need to 
obtain a warrant to install a GPS tracker in light of Knotts and Karo.76 Addi-
tionally, the Third Circuit panel admonished law enforcement for looking to 
non-binding authorities like sister circuits’ decisions, but also claimed the 
police acted in the face of unsettled law because one sister Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Id. (Van Antwerpen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majori-
ty’s analysis does not comply with Supreme Court precedent, which stresses that the criterion for 
the good faith exception is whether a reasonable officer would have known the search was illegal, 
not whether the officer relied on binding precedent). 
 74 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712–13 (1984) (holding that transfer of unmoni-
tored beeper onto a vehicle was not a search because the transfer did not convey information, and 
therefore did not encroach on any privacy interest); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 
(1983) (holding that complaints that scientific devices like tracking devices enable law enforce-
ment to be more effective in detecting crime have no constitutional foundation, and that the Court 
has “never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality”); United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 
251, 261–62 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding the beeper technology used in Knotts was similar enough to 
GPS technology and concluding that officers relied in good faith on Knotts when deciding to place 
the GPS device); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that “Knotts 
clearly authorized the agents to use a GPS-based tracking device in the place of a beeper”); United 
States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 834–35 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding any possible technological differ-
ences between a beeper and GPS device insufficient to make the government’s pre-Jones reliance 
on a Fifth Circuit beeper precedent unreasonable for good-faith purposes). 
 75 460 U.S. at 281; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (holding that “one has a 
lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation,” it has “little 
capacity for escaping public scrutiny,” and it travels public roads, putting its occupants and con-
tents in plain sight). 
 76 See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997–98 (7th 
Cir. 2007); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 26 
and accompanying text (discussing decisions prior to Katzin from the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits, which all held that attaching a GPS device to a target car was not a constitutional violation). 
The one exception was in 2010, in United States v. Maynard where the D.C. Circuit found that GPS 
surveillance constituted a search that required a warrant. See 615 F.3d 544, 555–56 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d in part sub nom., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). See generally Eli R. Shindel-
man, Time for the Court to Become “Intimate” with Surveillance Technology, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1909, 
1925–28 (2011) (examining the reasoning behind Maynard’s holding and its representation of socie-
ty’s changing expectations of privacy due to surveillance technology). 
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had ruled the opposite way on GPS tracking.77 Despite the court’s assertion 
in Katzin I, the police did not apply a “self-derived” rule in order to take the 
Fourth Amendment inquiry “into [their] own hands,” but acted in reasona-
ble reliance on guidance from binding precedent.78 
B. A Lack of Culpable Conduct in Katzin 
Even if the Third Circuit panel could not find that law enforcement 
reasonably relied on binding precedent, the police conduct was still far from 
a reckless disregard for Katzin’s rights.79 The U.S. Supreme Court has re-
peatedly affirmed that the exclusionary rule is a remedy of last resort, to be 
applied only when law enforcement personnel have shown a deliberate or 
grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights as a means of de-
terring future misconduct.80 When the police have a reasonable good faith 
belief that their conduct is lawful, or their action involves just isolated neg-
ligence, there is little to deter.81 
Contrary to the opinion of the Third Circuit panel, law enforcement 
personnel in Katzin were not attempting to circumvent the Fourth Amend-
ment in their installation of a GPS tracker.82 The police conduct in Katzin 
was not like the purposeful, reckless disregard of Fourth Amendment rights 
that the exclusionary rule aims to prevent.83 Enforcing such a strict scope of 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 209, 213 n.24 (holding that it is not the job of law enforcement to 
examine the decisions of sister circuits in order to predict what a court would say, but later stating 
that once the D.C. Circuit had split on the issue, law enforcement should have been “on notice” 
that GPS devices could implicate Fourth Amendment rights). 
 78 See id. at 211–12; see supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court and 
circuit court precedent). 
 79 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 211; see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (holding that when police 
recklessly disregard Fourth Amendment rights there is great benefit to exclusion). 
 80 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (“[T]he harsh sanction of exclusion should not be applied to 
deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 919) (internal 
citations omitted)); United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Herring, 
555 U.S. at 141) (holding that the exclusionary rule only applies when police conduct is “suffi-
ciently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 81 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426–28 (stating that the exclusionary rule’s singular purpose is to 
deter future Fourth Amendment violations); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (quoting Leon, 468 
U.S. at 909) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies only where it results in “appreciable deter-
rence”); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (holding that the exclusionary rule is 
calculated to prevent and deter, not repair). 
 82 Compare Katzin II, 769 F.3d at 182 (holding that officers acted with good faith belief that 
their conduct was lawful based on a wide range of authority), with Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 213 (hold-
ing that police disregarded possibility that warrantless GPS search could be a Fourth Amendment 
violation). 
 83 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 192. Not only did the police believe they were acting in accord-
ance with binding precedent regarding GPS searches, but they also consulted with the U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office prior to beginning GPS surveillance in an effort to ensure their actions were constitu-
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the good faith exception will not induce police to err on the side of constitu-
tional behavior, particularly given that the officers in Katzin believed they 
were already doing so.84 Furthermore, this limitation on the exception could 
actually inhibit police officers from taking action, for fear that their conduct 
has not been explicitly sanctioned by precedent in their circuit and could 
result in the future exclusion of critical evidence.85 
C. A Proper Good Faith Analysis of the Katzin Conduct  
Fortunately, in Katzin II, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
chose to rectify the panel’s misguided application of the exclusionary rule, 
and in doing so provided a good faith analysis of the police conduct in Katzin 
that remained true to the purpose of the exception.86 After granting a rehear-
ing of the exclusionary rule holding, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, recog-
nized good faith where the panel refused to, and ruled that the exception did 
apply to the law enforcement conduct in Katzin.87 The en banc court conclud-
ed that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in 1983 in Knotts, and in 1984 in 
Karo, both constituted binding appellate precedent that the officers in Katzin 
could have reasonably relied on at the time of their conduct.88 Additionally, 
the court held that under the Supreme Court’s more general good faith test, 
the exclusionary rule still should not apply because the agents acted with a 
good faith belief that their conduct was lawful.89 
                                                                                                                           
tional. See id. Yet the panel stated that a government attorney’s approval, standing alone, cannot 
and should not suffice to demonstrate good faith. See id. at 212 n.23; see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 
2429 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not aim to deter conscientious police work); Her-
ring, 555 U.S. at 143–44 (explaining that past abuses that have warranted the exclusionary rule 
featured intentional conduct that was clearly unconstitutional); Katzin II, 769 F.3d at 181 (holding 
that the court has previously considered reliance on government attorneys in the good faith calcu-
lus, and that such reliance plays a part in whether a reasonable officer would believe a search was 
valid). 
 84 See Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 214 (holding that excluding the evidence in this case will deter 
police from assuming that the court will find their conduct constitutional, even if the police be-
lieved they were relying on a constitutional principle). 
 85 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429 (determining that in a case where an officer was only acting 
as a reasonable officer would and should act, the deterrent effect of exclusion would only discour-
age the officer from doing his job); Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (same). 
 86 See Katzin II, 769 F.3d at 177–82 (holding that the Supreme Court has ordered the suppres-
sion of evidence to only occur in “unusual” circumstances, and that applying the exclusionary rule 
just because law enforcement did not adequately rely on binding appellate precedent would be far 
beyond this directive). 
 87 See id. 
 88 See id. at 174–77 (holding that what is important in finding Knotts and Karo to be binding 
precedent is that “the agents’ nearly identical conduct [in Katzin] fits squarely within the rationale 
of those decisions”); see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 712–13; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82. 
 89 See Katzin II, 769 F.3d at 177–82. 
48 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
The Third Circuit en banc determined that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
holding in 2011 in Davis v. United States was much broader than both the 
district court’s and Third Circuit panel’s interpretations.90 The en banc court 
acknowledged that the facts of Katzin were not the same as Knotts and Ka-
ro, but reasoned that is essentially always true in case comparisons, and 
held that the foundation of those Supreme Court decisions clearly sanc-
tioned the Katzin agents’ conduct.91 Furthermore, unlike the Third Circuit 
panel, the en banc court took into consideration the holdings of its sister 
circuits in concluding that the technological distinctions between beepers 
and GPS devices are irrelevant when determining good faith.92 
More importantly, the Third Circuit en banc recognized that the district 
court, and subsequently the Third Circuit panel, had improperly elevated the 
holding in Davis.93 The en banc court held that it was not its duty to solely 
determine whether Davis applied or if its holding should be extended, but 
rather to consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a 
reasonably well-trained officer would have known the search in question 
was illegal.94 In coming to its decision, the en banc court considered the 
“panoply of authority” that appeared to authorize the police conduct in Kat-
zin, including well-settled principles of Fourth Amendment law, a near-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See id. at 176 (explaining that reliance on binding precedent may be reasonable when the 
conduct at issue falls within the precedent’s rationale authorizing similar conduct). 
 91 See id. at 174–77 (holding that it was “objectively reasonable for law enforcement to con-
clude, prior to Jones and in reliance on Karo, that [attaching and monitoring a GPS device to a 
vehicle] was not a search because it infringed no privacy interest”); see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 
712–13; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284; United States v. Rose, 914 F. Supp. 2d 15, 23 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(asserting that if police had to wait until their own circuit weighed in on issues like GPS tracking, 
they could be “forced to wait decades to implement new technology or risk suppression even 
where, as here, the warrantless use of the technology was universally considered to be constitu-
tionally permissible”). 
 92 See Katzin II, 769 F.3d at 176; Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 209 (holding that any law enforcement 
officer who primarily relies on Fourth Amendment decisions of sister circuits does so “at his own 
peril” in regard to the exclusionary rule); see also United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200, 205 (6th 
Cir. 2014) (concluding that in-circuit beeper cases were binding appellate precedent for sporadic 
GPS use); Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 261 (concluding that the beeper used in Knotts was sufficiently 
similar to the GPS device employed); Sparks, 711 F.3d at 66 (holding that Knotts clearly author-
ized law enforcement’s use of a GPS device instead of a beeper). The court also noted that at least 
one circuit has rejected the Third Circuit panel’s opinion that a case must be from within the same 
circuit and be fact specific in order to constitute binding appellate precedent. See Katzin II, 769 
F.3d at 177; see also Aguiar, 737 F.3d at 260–61 (holding that, before Jones, the decisions in 
Knotts and Karo were binding appellate precedent under Davis for purposes of GPS installation 
and surveillance of a vehicle on public roads). 
 93 See Katzin II, 769 F.3d at 177 (holding that although Davis was the most closely related 
Supreme Court decision to the facts in Katzin, the good faith exception could still be applied even 
if Davis did not order it); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117 (2001) (rejecting 
the questionable logic that because an opinion finds a particular search to be constitutional, any 
search unlike it is then unconstitutional). 
 94 See Katzin II, 769 F.3d at 177. 
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unanimity of U.S. Courts of Appeals applying these principles to the same 
conduct, and the advice of an Assistant U.S. Attorney pursuant to a policy 
adhered to by the U.S. Department of Justice.95 
The en banc court held that law enforcement believing their conduct is 
lawful based on a “constitutional norm,” rather than binding appellate prec-
edent, is not like the deliberate and culpable conduct for which the exclu-
sionary rule was created.96 Furthermore, the court declared that regardless 
of whether law enforcement officers unreasonably rely on non-binding au-
thority one day, the court still had a present duty to determine whether the 
particular law enforcement conduct in Katzin warranted the exclusionary 
rule.97 The Third Circuit en banc correctly ruled that the exclusionary rule 
would be inappropriate in Katzin II, and in doing so, conducted a good faith 
analysis superior to the Third Circuit panel’s narrow interpretation.98 
CONCLUSION 
The Third Circuit panel’s decision in United States v. Katzin (Katzin I) 
was a significant ruling in applying the Fourth Amendment protection 
against search and seizure to the continued advances in surveillance tech-
nology of law enforcement. As tracking devices have become increasingly 
enhanced, it is unsurprising that courts have become more vigilant in limit-
ing the warrantless technological searches of individual’s persons and prop-
erty, as the Third Circuit did in Katzin I. Yet what was troubling about the 
Third Circuit panel’s holding was its own unwarranted limitation of the 
scope of the good faith exception articulated in Davis v. United States, and 
how it could have affected applications of the exclusionary rule and police 
conduct in the future. The Third Circuit panel’s ruling failed to serve the 
purpose of the good faith exception as mandated by the Supreme Court, and 
the en banc court was correct to reverse the decision and apply the excep-
tion in Katzin II. The Third Circuit en banc aptly recognized that the exclu-
                                                                                                                           
 95 See id. at 181 (noting also that the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s advice was given pursuant to a 
U.S. Department of Justice-wide policy that the agents’ conduct did not require a warrant). 
 96 See id. at 183–84 (holding the wide array of non-binding authority allowing a warrantless 
GPS search to establish a “constitutional norm”); see also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 
542 (1975) (stating that unless the Court held that parties could not rely on legal declarations from 
sources outside the Court, they cannot find parties culpable who conform their conduct to a “pre-
vailing constitutional norm”); Kyle Robbins, Davis, Jones, and the Good-Faith Exception: Why 
Reasonable Police Reliance on Persuasive Appellant Precedent Precludes Application of the 
Exclusionary Rule, 82 MISS. L.J. 1175, 1192–95 (2013) (arguing that officers who reasonably rely 
on persuasive authority cannot be deterred by exclusion because they are not any more culpable 
than officers who rely on binding appellate authority). 
 97 See Katzin II, 769 F.3d at 187 (stating that “future decisions may reveal that applying the 
good faith exception to reliance on non-binding authority should be extremely rare,” but that was 
not a question the court currently needed to answer). 
 98 See id. at 177–84; see also Katzin I, 732 F.3d at 206–14. 
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sionary rule has no place in a case where law enforcement acted with an 
objectively reasonable good faith belief that their conduct was lawful. 
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